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Privacy Leakage of Physical Activity Levels in
Wireless Embedded Wearable Systems
Xenofon Fafoutis, Member, IEEE, Letizia Marchegiani, Member, IEEE,
Georgios Z. Papadopoulos, Member, IEEE, Robert Piechocki, Theo Tryfonas, and George Oikonomou
Abstract—With the ubiquity of sensing technologies in our
personal spaces, the protection of our privacy and the confi-
dentiality of sensitive data becomes a major concern. In this
paper, we focus on wearable embedded systems that communicate
data periodically over the wireless medium. In this context,
we demonstrate that private information about the physical
activity levels of the wearer can leak to an eavesdropper through
the physical layer. Indeed, we show that the physical activity
levels strongly correlate with changes in the wireless channel
that can be captured by measuring the signal strength of the
eavesdropped frames. We practically validate this correlation
in several scenarios in a real residential environment, using
data collected by our prototype wearable accelerometer-based
sensor. Lastly, we propose a privacy enhancement algorithm that
mitigates the leakage of this private information.
Index Terms—Security and Privacy; Embedded System Secu-
rity; Wearable Systems; Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
Ageing populations [1] and the rise of chronic illness push
the limits of national health systems [2]. Wearable technolo-
gies [3] and Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) infrastructures
are widely considered as promising solutions that could en-
courage people to monitor their own well-being and facilitate
timely interventions. Activity monitors, such as Fitbit, Jaw-
bone UP and Nike+ Fuelband SE, have recently appeared in
the consumer electronics market [4]. These wearable gadgets
demonstrate the rise of a trend towards self-monitoring, as well
as the user acceptability of wearable technologies. Yet, such
gadgets are of limited use for novel applications due to their
lack of interoperability with other healthcare systems, their
limited expandability to new sensing technologies, and the
restricted accessibility of the raw data. More recently, wearable
sensors have been used along other sensing technologies to
form multi-modal residential infrastructures that are capable of
understanding how daily activities affect our well-being. The
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goal of these multi-modal platforms is to relieve the healthcare
sector and improve the quality of life [5] [6].
Privacy concerns rise with the ubiquity of sensing tech-
nologies in our daily life and our private spaces [7] [8]. The
legal right to information privacy is defined as the right for
the protection of personal or private information from misuse
or unauthorised disclosure. As a result, any unintentional
disclosure of personal data can be considered as a violation of
privacy. In [9], the authors evaluate various commercial per-
sonal health monitoring devices with respect to policies they
adopt to protect the privacy of their users. Other works in this
space have identified privacy attacks on wearable embedded
systems and proposed mechanisms against them. In [10], the
authors identified that different medical wearable sensors tend
to have different traffic patterns, and information about the
nature and the urgency of the medical condition of the patient
may leak through those patterns. In [11], the authors identified
security vulnerabilities in a commercial fitness tracker that
allowed them to extract private fitness information. In [12] and
[13], the effect of human bodies on WiFi signals is leveraged
to passively extract information about their pose and gesture.
In this letter, we identify and experimentally validate that,
in wireless embedded wearable systems, information about
the physical activity levels of the user may leak through the
wireless channel, when such devices transmit periodically.
More specifically, we demonstrate that a passive eavesdropper
can measure the dynamic changes of the wireless channel
caused by the activity of the user, through the variability of the
Received Signal Strength (RSS) of the eavesdropped packets.
This metric strongly correlates with the physical activity levels
of the user. Using our prototype wearable sensor [14], mounted
on the wrist of a user in a real residential environment, we
experimentally validate this potential violation of privacy in
data sets that include a wide range of Activities of Daily Living
(ADL). Moreover, this letter proposes a privacy enhancement
algorithm that mitigates this leakage, by introducing artificial
randomness in the wireless channel when the user is inactive.
The remainder of this letter is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II sets the scope of this work, presenting the legitimate
use of the wearable system and the assumptions about the
attacker. Section III presents and experimentally validates the
privacy attack on data collected in a residential environment.
Section IV proposes and experimentally validates the effec-
tiveness of a privacy enhancement countermeasure against this
privacy attack. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. The wearable embedded system used for the experimental results [14].
II. SCOPE AND THREAT MODEL
Let us consider Alice. Alice is using a wearable sensor
to monitor her physical activity levels. The wearable sensor
is equipped with a triaxial accelerometer for sensing, and
a wireless radio for transmitting the raw data in her smart
home for post-processing and for fusing them with other
sensing modalities. In addition, the raw acceleration data
are transformed into activity levels using the Integral of the
Modulus of Acceleration (IMA). This metric is commonly
used in the literature for estimating physical activity levels
[15], as it correlates with the energy expenditure of a person
[16]. The magnitude of a single acceleration sample, ~a ∈ R3,
is calculated as:
||~a|| =
∣∣∣√a2x + a2y + a2z − 1∣∣∣ (1)
where ax, ay and az denote the acceleration on each of the
three axes respectively, measured in g-units (g = 9.8 m/s2).
The gravity component (1 g) is subtracted from the magnitude
of the raw signal to isolate the acceleration of Alice. Consider-
ing a discrete time series of samples, ~a0,~a1 . . .~an, the rolling
IMA of the N -th sample over a window of w samples is then
approximated as:
IMAN =
w−1∑
i=0
||~aN−i|| , N ≥ w . (2)
Alice considers her physical activity levels private. Thus, she
uses an off-the-shelf encryption algorithm to encrypt the raw
acceleration data that are transmitted over the air.
In this paper, we demonstrate that despite any encryption,
private information about Alice’s physical activity levels can
be leaked through the RSS of eavesdropped packets. Let us
consider Eve, the eavesdropper. We assume that Eve has no
physical access to Alice’s home environment home. Instead,
we assume that Eve has physical access to the common areas
outside of Alice’s home environment; areas that are within
the wireless range of the wearable device of Alice. Indeed,
it has been shown that the signal of a wearable system can
traverse through multiple walls in residential environments
[17]. Hence, Eve is able to eavesdrop and store the encrypted
packets of the raw acceleration data, using a passive sniffer.
Lastly, we assume that Eve has no access to the encryption key
of Alice, and has no other means of decrypting the transmitted
packets.
III. THE PRIVACY ATTACK
Eve, the eavesdropper, listens to the wireless channel and
collects all the encrypted frames that contain the raw acceler-
ation data. For each received frame, Eve, measures the power
TABLE I
ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING INCLUDED IN EACH SESSION
Session Duration Activity List
1 16 m Walking, vacuuming, dusting, cleaning
2 30 m Walking, sitting, cooking, eating,
preparing drink, drinking, watching TV
3 30 m Walking, washing hands, drying hands,
brushing teeth, grooming
4 16 m Walking, sitting, watching TV
5 14 m Sitting, working, using computer
6 13 m Sitting, working, using computer
7 13 m Sitting, walking, working, using computer,
watching TV
8 13 m Sitting, walking, watching TV
9 14 m Sitting, watching TV
10 14 m Sitting, watching TV
11 18 m Sitting, walking, watching TV, cooking,
eating
of the received signal, RSS . The fundamental hypothesis for
the success of the privacy attack is that the physical activity
levels of Alice, IMA, correlate with the standard deviation of
the first derivative of the RSS , denoted as RSS ′, as measured
by Eve. Indeed, human activity inevitably makes the wireless
channel more dynamic. Practically, Eve calculates this rolling
standard deviation of the N -th sample (σN ) over a window of
w samples as follows:
σN =
√√√√ 1
w − 1
w−1∑
i=0
(RSS ′N−i − RSS
′
N )
2 , N ≥ w , (3)
where RSS ′N is the mean over the same window w.
A privacy attack on the physical activity levels is considered
successful when there is statistically significant correlation
between the secret signal (2) and the one derived by Eve (3)
for at least one window configuration, w. More specifically,
we use the Pierson’s linear correlation coefficient (denoted as
c), and we test its significance against a null hypothesis of no
significant correlation with a randomisation test (Nsamples =
10000). The correlation is considered statistically significant
when the null hypothesis is rejected with a p-value < 0.05.
The Pierson’s correlation coefficient is chosen because the data
suggest a linear relationship.
We validate the hypothesis of the presented privacy attack
with real data collected in a prototype 2-storey terraced house
in the city of Bristol, UK [17]. The acceleration data are
generated by SPW-1 [14], an accelerometer-based wearable
sensor that communicates data to the smart home using the
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) standard [18]. SPW-1 (shown
in Fig. 1) employs the ADXL362 accelerometer [19], which
is configured to: 20 Hz sampling frequency, 12-bit resolution,
and ±4 g sampling range (g = 9.8 m/s2). The transmission
frequency is 5 Hz, because of the fact that 4 data samples are
packed in one advertisement frame. As a result, Eve collects
RSS values at a maximum rate of 5 Hz (packets can be lost
due to channel errors). In this context, we validate the privacy
attack on data retrieved from a person living freely in the
prototype smart house, whilst wearing the wearable sensor on
their dominant wrist (the data is available in [20]). Therefore,
we validate our hypothesis on several sessions of actual data
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Fig. 2. Experimental results on the first session yield very strong correlation
(c = 0.87) between the physical activity levels (IMA) and the standard
deviation of the derivative of the RSS (w = 500). The magnitude of the
acceleration, ||~a||, is in g-units. The received signal strength, RSS , is in
dBm. Its derivative, RSS ′, is in dBm per sampling period.
of a person being engaged in various activities of daily living
(such as cooking, eating, working, and watching TV) in a real
residential environment. A summary of the sessions and the
activities of daily living is shown in Table I.
As an example, Fig. 2 demonstrates the privacy attack on
the first session. The first two subplots (top of the figure) plot
the secret signal of Alice, i.e., the magnitude of acceleration
||~a|| obtained by (1) and the IMA obtained by (2) for a window
of w = 500 samples. It can be observed that there is an
offset of approximately 0.2 g in the acceleration profile. This
is because of sensing noise, and because the accelerometer
is not calibrated to the supply voltage (see Fig. 48 in [19]).
The remaining three subplots (bottom of the figure) plot the
signal observed by Eve, i.e., the raw received signal strength
(RSS ), its derivative and the rolling standard deviation of the
derivative as obtained by (3). It is calculated that there is a
significant (p < 0.0001) and very strong (c = 0.87) correlation
between the IMA and the signal derived by Eve.
Fig. 3 illustrates the correlation coefficient for the same
session for various window sizes (w). It can be observed that
there is moderate short-term correlation for w ≤ 60, and strong
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Fig. 3. Correlation between the private signal, i.e. the physical activity levels,
and the signal derived by the eavesdropper for various window sizes, w. The
correlation is significant (p < 0.0001) at all considered window sizes.
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Fig. 4. Strongest significant correlation (p < 0.05) in each of the sessions.
The results demonstrate that psychical activity information leaks consistently
in different sessions that capture various activities of daily living. Each session
number corresponds to the session number shown in Table I.
and very strong long-term correlation for w ≥ 60, indicating
that information leaks both when physical activity levels
are fine-grained and coarse-grained. The strongest correlation
(c = 0.97) is observed at w = 1500. The measured correlation
is significant (p < 0.0001) at all considered window sizes.
Extending the analysis on the remaining of our sessions
validates the vulnerability in various activities of daily living.
Fig. 4 plots the strongest significant (p < 0.05) correlation
observed in each session. The average strongest correlation
is 91.6%. This demonstrates that private information about
the physical activity levels of the user can be unintentionally
disclosed in a wide range of scenarios. In addition, this
vulnerability can be potentially exploited by a malicious
eavesdropper as an initial step towards recognising the actual
activities of the user. To this end, the attacker would require
additional information to disambiguate between activities that
correspond to similar physical activity levels.
IV. PRIVACY ENHANCEMENT
Fundamentally, information about the physical activity lev-
els of Alice leak to Eve because the physical movements of Al-
ice cause variations in the channel observed by Eve. This can
be illustrated by the link budget formula: RSSi = PTX+PLi(~a),
where PTX is the transmission power and PL is the channel
gain, including the antenna gains. The channel gain partially
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Fig. 5. The effectiveness of the proposed privacy enhancement scheme for
various randomisation levels (L). The solid line corresponds to the mean and
the shade corresponds to one standard deviation over 20 runs (A = 0.08 g).
depends on the movements of Alice. The transmission power,
on the other hand, is fully controlled by Alice within the limits
of the radio. Therefore, the leakage can be mitigated if Alice
introduces artificial variations in the channel by randomly
changing the transmission power when low physical activity
is detected by the accelerometer. By doing so, Eve would not
be able to infer the source of the observed variations in the
channel. In addition, if Alice needs to reconstruct the channel
state, she can include PTX in the encrypted payload.
Let us consider the following privacy enhancement mecha-
nism running on the wearable system. The algorithm has two
input parameters: A, an acceleration threshold below which the
randomisation is introduced, and L, the randomisation level. It
is noted that if Alice introduces more artificial variation than
her physical activity, she would create negative correlation,
and information about her physical activity levels would leak
to Eve. Thus, the goal of Alice is to run the algorithm with
the input parameters that minimise the absolute correlation.
Algorithm 1 Privacy Enhancement Algorithm
input : A, L
output: PTX
for every ADV transmission do
calculate ||~a|| using (1);
if ||~a|| < A then
k ← rand();
PTX ← Pmax − Pstep · (k mod L);
else
PTX ← Pmax;
end
end
Next, we apply the proposed privacy enhancement algo-
rithm on our platform, SPW-1. The radio of SPW-1 offers 7
transmission power levels from −20 dBm to +4 dBm with a
4 dB step (i.e. Pmax = 5 dBm, Pstep = 4 dB) [14]. Focusing
on the first data session, Fig. 5 demonstrates the impact of the
randomisation level (L) to the absolute correlation of the signal
extracted by Eve and secret signal for a constant threshold
A = 0.08 g. Similarly, Fig. 6 demonstrates the impact of
the threshold (A) to the absolute correlation for a constant
Fig. 6. The effectiveness of the proposed privacy enhancement scheme for
various thresholds (A). The solid lines correspond to the mean and the shade
corresponds to one standard deviation over 20 runs (L = 3).
randomisation level L = 3. In both figures, the solid lines
correspond to the mean and the shades correspond to one
standard deviation over 20 runs. The dashed line corresponds
to the baseline scenario, as presented in Section III. It can
be observed that proposed algorithm can be a very effective
privacy enhancement scheme against the presented attack. It
can also be observed that both configuration parameters have
an optimum value; beyond which Alice overcompensates the
effects of her movement on the channel gain.
Following the same methodology on the remaining sessions
leads to similar results, yielding an average strongest correla-
tion of 41.8%.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As wearable embedded systems collect sensitive personal
information, data confidentiality becomes a fundamental sys-
tem requirement. Any unintentional disclosure of private in-
formation can be considered as a violation of privacy.
In this paper, we focus on wearable systems that communi-
cate data periodically. We demonstrate that private information
about the physical activity levels of their wearer can leak
through the physical wireless channel to an eavesdropper, even
when the data is encrypted. Using data collected with our
prototype wearable sensor in a real residential environment,
we demonstrate that the physical activity levels of the user
strongly correlate with the standard deviation of the derivative
of the received signal strength, as observed by a passive eaves-
dropper, in a wide variety of daily life activities. Furthermore,
we propose a privacy enhancement algorithm that introduces
artificial variations in the wireless channel, by randomising the
transmission power when there is lack of activity.
As future work, it would be interesting to investigate if
Eve can successfully execute the attack under packet loss by
applying missing data techniques [21] on the eavesdropped
signal. In addition, we plan to combine this privacy attack,
with RSS -based indoors localisation algorithms. For instance,
Eve could use the wall prediction model, presented in [22], to
correspond the physical activity levels of Alice to the room in
which these activities occurred.
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